Showing posts with label tamil eelam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label tamil eelam. Show all posts
Monday, February 6, 2012
India Responsible for Dividing Sri Lanka, Training LTTE Terrorists - JR ...
India Responsible for Dividing Sri Lanka, Training LTTE Terrorists - JR former SL President 1985. In 1985, during an Interview with BBC former President of Sri Lanka MR. J R Jayawardene says that India is training Tamil Tigers (LTTE terrorists) in India to capture Sri Lanka. India is accountable for more than 200,000 civilian deaths in Sri Lanka and directly caused two civil wars (LTTE (1982-2009) & JVP (1988-1990) ) in Sri Lanka. The LTTE was defeated in 2009, still India causes Eelam tension in Sri Lanka by Tamil Nadu politicians and Tamils/ fishermen. video link
0:00 BBC:Rajiv (India PM) attempts to force him to sit down and negotiate with Tigers (LTTE terrorists).
0:06 JR: I think we can deal with them. But we need the sympathy of the world, we need the support of India. Because their (Tamil Tigers) training camps are in India, they have been trained in India, and they are operating from India. They move about freely in India. And I dont think they should allow to do that, to use violence against as a friendly state.
0:23 But thats how you feel about it. But within Sri Lanka you have no alternative BUT to fight the guerrillas until you defeat them militarily?
0:29 JR: Until they give up arms, yes. Nothing else I can do.
0:34 BBC: But the danger would be that in the process of defeating them militarily supposing that you can do it, then you are alienating a lot of Tamil opinion. Which at least these people are Tamils. No we dont want them to be killed.
0:44 JR: I dont think so. I think am not afraid of alienating Tamil opinion. I am afraid of alienating public opinion of the world, your country (British) and other countries including large section in India have a wrong impression of what is happening there (Sri Lanka) as an Ethnic conflict. It is not an ethnic conflict, it is a conflict of one people who wants to capture the "whole of Sri Lanka". Not a portion. "The whole of Sri Lanka" and make it a Marxist sate.
In 1987 Sri Lanka's former President Mr J.R.Jayewardene was pushed by India. India Invaded Sri Lanka's air apace by sending Kfir fighter jets dropping weapons (LTTE) and food to North-Eeast of Sri Lanka.
(New York Times, June 03, 1987) SRI LANKA THREATENS TO HALT INDIAN BOATS BEARING TAMIL RELIEF. Sri Lanka and India appeared headed for a confrontation tonight as the Government here ordered its armed forces to intercept a shipment of supplies from India to ethnic Tamils in the north.
Brushing off the Sri Lankan threats, India proceeded with preparations for the delivery of ''humanitarian assistance'' by an unarmed flotilla of 20 fishing boats scheduled to leave the southern Indian port of Rameswaram on Wednesday morning.
India said it had warships stationed on the Indian side of the Palk Strait, which separates the two countries, ready to move if the Sri Lankans tried to stop the shipment. ''If they try to stop those boats, God help them,'' an Indian official said.
Subsequent in August 1987, Sri Lanka had to agree with India due pressure on Sri Lanka and no support from International community. The prime minister of India Rajiv Gandhi came to Sri Lanka to bring about a solution to the Tamil armed problem which was ceated by India. Indo-Lanka Peace accord was signed in 1987 against the will of the nation and the Government. Rajiv Gandhi was hit by Navy sailor's riffle butt while Rajiv was inspecting the Guard of Honour. As a result of Indo-Lanka Peace Accord (1987) the IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Forces) was sent in to Sri Lanka by India. The peace accord was very unpopular among the Sri Lankan folks. A civil war erupted between Govt abd JVP in South killing over 60,000 Sinhalese people while LTTE war in North during 1988-1990).
In 1990 President Sri Lanka R. Premadasa and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi were murdered by LTTE suicide bombers.
In 2009 under the presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa Sri Lankan Security forces defeated LTTE and the day of victory was announces on 19th May 2009.
Saturday, October 8, 2011
My Dear Tamil People - A Call From Imprisoned Canadian Tamils to Tamil Diaspora
" My dear Tamil people all over the world, Let us not even for a second talk about arms again. War is not the answer to anything.... We incorrectly believed that violence could achieve the goals that we sought... We now realize that what we did was not helpful in leading to a positive resolution of the issues that existed in Sri Lanka.” (from prison cell by Canadian Tamils)
Sunday, September 11, 2011
True Facts of Sri Lanka War by Gotabaya
The full Speech of Sri Lanka's Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa at the launching of the report titled ‘Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis’ July 2006 - May 2009 held on August 1 in Colombo.
"The purpose of today’s event is to officially release the report that has been compiled by the Ministry of Defence on the Humanitarian Operation. The purpose of this report is to set out the factual background and operational context, which brought peace to Sri Lanka by liberating our people from the brutal terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the LTTE, in May 2009.
"The purpose of today’s event is to officially release the report that has been compiled by the Ministry of Defence on the Humanitarian Operation. The purpose of this report is to set out the factual background and operational context, which brought peace to Sri Lanka by liberating our people from the brutal terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the LTTE, in May 2009.
The report begins with a detailed analysis of the LTTE, including its true nature and its growth and sophistication over the years and the threat it posed to all Sri Lankans. The LTTE was a vicious terrorist group that suppressed democracy in the areas it dominated, killed all its rivals and assassinated moderate Tamil politicians and intellectuals and spread terror throughout Sri Lanka with its many attacks on innocent civilians. Raising funds through its international criminal network, the LTTE not only had the ability to use semi-conventional tactics on land, but also acquired sea and air dimensions to strengthen its offensive capability.
Wednesday, June 30, 2010
KP-Diaspora programme operated by SL Military Intelligence: Doctor Arudkumar
Updated on 12 Oct 2011
[TamilNet, Monday, 28 June 2010, 21:31 GMT]
Sri Lankan Director of National Intelligence, Major General Kapila Hendawitharana, the longest serving intelligence officer of the military, is in charge of the covert and overt programme of dividing and conquering the Tamil diaspora, alludes British Tamil doctor Velauthapillai Arudkumar, who visited the island recently as part of a ‘Tamil diaspora visit’ organised by Colombo through Selvarasa Pathmanathan alias KP. TamilNet releases an exclusive video interview with Dr. Arudkumar taken two days ago, in which he reveals the details of the trip. SL Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, Maj. Gen. Hendawitharana and External Affairs Minister G.L.Peiris, all spoke in a well-synchronised way. Military counterinsurgency and 'post-war development' are intertwined aiming at Tamil subjugation, the doctor infers in his interview Dr. Arudkumar was one of the nine diaspora Eezham Tamils who visited the island from 6 countries between 15 June and 20 June. KP and his associates in the diaspora played a crucial role in mobilising this diaspora group to have talks with the Sri Lankan government on post-war rehabilitation of civilians and former LTTE cadres in detention. The doctor says he made the decision as an individual to explore the opportunity to help the uprooted civilians, people incarcerated and those held in detention camps. Earlier, he had served the people of Vaakarai in Batticaloa for four weeks after the 2004 tsunami catastrophe. "I am not a politician. I only wanted to help," he said.
But, after sensing the intentions behind the Sri Lankan military intelligence, the foreign minister and the defence secretary, and experiencing the restrictions put in place, his decision was not to succumb to the tactics of Colombo. They will only bring their mindset into you, attempt to divide and destroy you. They will misuse your intentions for their advantage, especially in convincing the West that the Tamil diaspora is now cooperating with them, the doctor said. KP told the diaspora visitors that one should be satisfied with what is being offered and should look after the civilians and the former cadres. He was sounding 'spiritual' and was criticising the political initiatives of the diaspora.
The TNA speaks only about political solution and Tamil Nadu leaders are jokers (koamaa'lika'l), is the opinion reflected in the speeches of Kapila, Gotabhaya and KP, says the doctor. The visitors were told of outside interests in the land of the North and East. When asked who were those outsiders, the reply pointed at India. Dr. Arudkumar thinks there is an intention in the Sri Lankan side to bring in a rift between Eezham Tamils and India / Tamil Nadu.
"Even if you can't, we will bring the diaspora to cooperate," the visitors were told with arrogance and confidence.
Tamils have no right to ask for political solution and they should accept whatever that is given, was the attitude of the government side, and it was like treating Tamils as slaves, says Arudkumar, adding that when such was the attitude he felt embarrassed to see KP’s gesture of embracing Gotabhaya at the meeting.
The terms like transnational, united, federal, etc, are sensitive terms and they should be avoided. From South Africa to Japan, countries have so many other models. One should go to the grassroot to find the solution, professor G.L.Peris told the visitors. One should not talk about the 'past' or 'history', but should cooperate to build the country together. Mahinda has got a mandate from the [Sinhala] people, was the response from the government side when the visitors began talking about political solution.
When KP was asked about his arrest, he told the visitors that he was arrested by the Malaysian authorities, interrogated for two days and was flown to Colombo with Sri Lankan intelligence officer Sam, a subordinate of Kapila Hendawitharana. Sam was also present at the meetings. Kapila Hendawitharana in his conversations mentioned that he had met KP back in 2006, says Dr. Arudkumar, who describes the intelligence chief as the 'master mind'. KP was giving details of different personalities in various countries and was talking about properties and money associated with them. When Arudkumar asked why couldn't the Sri Lankan government release the frozen TRO money for the use of the resettlement of civilians, Kapila Hendawitharana responded by saying that the visitors should first start bringing in the diaspora money.
The number of people to be rehabilitated varies from one government agency to another, between 190,000 to more than 300,000. Perhaps the needs are different for them to cite different numbers, politics on one hand and money on the other. The visitors were taken to Palaali military base and were briefed by the commanders there before being taken to Raamaavil in Thenmaraadchi where they met resettled families. But, there were intelligence operatives. Visitors were not allowed to meet civilians in Ki'linochchi. When visiting Cheddiku'lam internment camp in Vavuniyaa, the visitors wanted to see Zone-4 of the camp, but they were only taken to Zone-2. While talking to the families in the camp we were able to detect that some people had been planted among the IDPs to interact with us, the doctor said. When there are already a number of organisations working for rehabilitation what was the need for Tamil Rehabilitation Centre (TRC) initiated by KP, asks the doctor, reasoning that it was to show the outside world that the diaspora is now politically with the government. Even while we were on our visit there was talk that many more diaspora groups were going to come. What I tell them is that it is of no use. KP can do very little, Dr. Arudkumar said. Maj. Gen. Kapila Hendawitharana During Chandrika Kumaratunga's presidency, Kapila Hendawitharana was in charge of the military intelligence. He played a crucial role in getting the renegade LTTE commander Karuna to work with the Sri Lankan military intelligence and in launching covert operations against the LTTE, resulting in a series of assassinations. His unit was mainly responsible for the serious violations of the clause 1.8 of the Ceasefire Agreement by deploying paramilitary operatives against the Tigers. After repeated complaints from various actors, he was transferred and posted to Thailand as Defence Attaché. Later, when Rajapaksa came to power, he was made the intelligence chief to coordinate with Gotabhaya and Fonseka.
As the Sri Lankan diplomatic establishments across the world are extensively militarised in recent times, diaspora circles fear that a major covert operation against diaspora Eezham Tamils is already in progress and that the KP programme is only a tip of the iceberg.
Source: Tamil Net: KP-Diaspora programme operated by SL Military Intelligence: Doctor Arudkumar
Related articles:
KUMARAN PATHMANATHAN a.k.a. KP IS STILL A HARD CORE TERRORIST WHO DOESN’T DESERVE ANY MERCY
http://www.tamilnewsnetwork.com/2010/06/28/kp-diaspora-programme-operated-by-sl-military-intelligence-doctor-arudkumar/
Tags: Dr Arudkumar Velauthapillai, Kapila Hendawitharana, KP, KUMARAN PATHMANATHAN, LTTE, Selvarasa Pathmanathan, Sri Lanka, sri lanka expats, Sri Lanka News, Sri Lanka War, tamil diaspora, Eezham Tamils, tamil eelam, tamilnet, Counter Terrorism, LLRC, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, KP Arrest, tiger trap, TRO, Sri Lanka reconciliation, TAG, IDP sri lanka,
[TamilNet, Monday, 28 June 2010, 21:31 GMT]
Sri Lankan Director of National Intelligence, Major General Kapila Hendawitharana, the longest serving intelligence officer of the military, is in charge of the covert and overt programme of dividing and conquering the Tamil diaspora, alludes British Tamil doctor Velauthapillai Arudkumar, who visited the island recently as part of a ‘Tamil diaspora visit’ organised by Colombo through Selvarasa Pathmanathan alias KP. TamilNet releases an exclusive video interview with Dr. Arudkumar taken two days ago, in which he reveals the details of the trip. SL Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, Maj. Gen. Hendawitharana and External Affairs Minister G.L.Peiris, all spoke in a well-synchronised way. Military counterinsurgency and 'post-war development' are intertwined aiming at Tamil subjugation, the doctor infers in his interview Dr. Arudkumar was one of the nine diaspora Eezham Tamils who visited the island from 6 countries between 15 June and 20 June. KP and his associates in the diaspora played a crucial role in mobilising this diaspora group to have talks with the Sri Lankan government on post-war rehabilitation of civilians and former LTTE cadres in detention. The doctor says he made the decision as an individual to explore the opportunity to help the uprooted civilians, people incarcerated and those held in detention camps. Earlier, he had served the people of Vaakarai in Batticaloa for four weeks after the 2004 tsunami catastrophe. "I am not a politician. I only wanted to help," he said.
But, after sensing the intentions behind the Sri Lankan military intelligence, the foreign minister and the defence secretary, and experiencing the restrictions put in place, his decision was not to succumb to the tactics of Colombo. They will only bring their mindset into you, attempt to divide and destroy you. They will misuse your intentions for their advantage, especially in convincing the West that the Tamil diaspora is now cooperating with them, the doctor said. KP told the diaspora visitors that one should be satisfied with what is being offered and should look after the civilians and the former cadres. He was sounding 'spiritual' and was criticising the political initiatives of the diaspora.
The TNA speaks only about political solution and Tamil Nadu leaders are jokers (koamaa'lika'l), is the opinion reflected in the speeches of Kapila, Gotabhaya and KP, says the doctor. The visitors were told of outside interests in the land of the North and East. When asked who were those outsiders, the reply pointed at India. Dr. Arudkumar thinks there is an intention in the Sri Lankan side to bring in a rift between Eezham Tamils and India / Tamil Nadu.
"Even if you can't, we will bring the diaspora to cooperate," the visitors were told with arrogance and confidence.
Tamils have no right to ask for political solution and they should accept whatever that is given, was the attitude of the government side, and it was like treating Tamils as slaves, says Arudkumar, adding that when such was the attitude he felt embarrassed to see KP’s gesture of embracing Gotabhaya at the meeting.
The terms like transnational, united, federal, etc, are sensitive terms and they should be avoided. From South Africa to Japan, countries have so many other models. One should go to the grassroot to find the solution, professor G.L.Peris told the visitors. One should not talk about the 'past' or 'history', but should cooperate to build the country together. Mahinda has got a mandate from the [Sinhala] people, was the response from the government side when the visitors began talking about political solution.
When KP was asked about his arrest, he told the visitors that he was arrested by the Malaysian authorities, interrogated for two days and was flown to Colombo with Sri Lankan intelligence officer Sam, a subordinate of Kapila Hendawitharana. Sam was also present at the meetings. Kapila Hendawitharana in his conversations mentioned that he had met KP back in 2006, says Dr. Arudkumar, who describes the intelligence chief as the 'master mind'. KP was giving details of different personalities in various countries and was talking about properties and money associated with them. When Arudkumar asked why couldn't the Sri Lankan government release the frozen TRO money for the use of the resettlement of civilians, Kapila Hendawitharana responded by saying that the visitors should first start bringing in the diaspora money.
The number of people to be rehabilitated varies from one government agency to another, between 190,000 to more than 300,000. Perhaps the needs are different for them to cite different numbers, politics on one hand and money on the other. The visitors were taken to Palaali military base and were briefed by the commanders there before being taken to Raamaavil in Thenmaraadchi where they met resettled families. But, there were intelligence operatives. Visitors were not allowed to meet civilians in Ki'linochchi. When visiting Cheddiku'lam internment camp in Vavuniyaa, the visitors wanted to see Zone-4 of the camp, but they were only taken to Zone-2. While talking to the families in the camp we were able to detect that some people had been planted among the IDPs to interact with us, the doctor said. When there are already a number of organisations working for rehabilitation what was the need for Tamil Rehabilitation Centre (TRC) initiated by KP, asks the doctor, reasoning that it was to show the outside world that the diaspora is now politically with the government. Even while we were on our visit there was talk that many more diaspora groups were going to come. What I tell them is that it is of no use. KP can do very little, Dr. Arudkumar said. Maj. Gen. Kapila Hendawitharana During Chandrika Kumaratunga's presidency, Kapila Hendawitharana was in charge of the military intelligence. He played a crucial role in getting the renegade LTTE commander Karuna to work with the Sri Lankan military intelligence and in launching covert operations against the LTTE, resulting in a series of assassinations. His unit was mainly responsible for the serious violations of the clause 1.8 of the Ceasefire Agreement by deploying paramilitary operatives against the Tigers. After repeated complaints from various actors, he was transferred and posted to Thailand as Defence Attaché. Later, when Rajapaksa came to power, he was made the intelligence chief to coordinate with Gotabhaya and Fonseka.
As the Sri Lankan diplomatic establishments across the world are extensively militarised in recent times, diaspora circles fear that a major covert operation against diaspora Eezham Tamils is already in progress and that the KP programme is only a tip of the iceberg.
Source: Tamil Net: KP-Diaspora programme operated by SL Military Intelligence: Doctor Arudkumar
Related articles:
KUMARAN PATHMANATHAN a.k.a. KP IS STILL A HARD CORE TERRORIST WHO DOESN’T DESERVE ANY MERCY
http://www.tamilnewsnetwork.com/2010/06/28/kp-diaspora-programme-operated-by-sl-military-intelligence-doctor-arudkumar/
Tags: Dr Arudkumar Velauthapillai, Kapila Hendawitharana, KP, KUMARAN PATHMANATHAN, LTTE, Selvarasa Pathmanathan, Sri Lanka, sri lanka expats, Sri Lanka News, Sri Lanka War, tamil diaspora, Eezham Tamils, tamil eelam, tamilnet, Counter Terrorism, LLRC, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, KP Arrest, tiger trap, TRO, Sri Lanka reconciliation, TAG, IDP sri lanka,
Thursday, January 28, 2010
Congratulations Mr President Mahinda Rajapakse - A Note With Love
Dear Mr. President Mahinda Rajapakse,
Congratulations! You have won the Sri Lanka Presidential Election 2010. You have been rewarded by the people of Sri Lanka for the promises you delivered. You deserve that. You have been a great leader to the nation by delivering promises you made and defending us not only from the most ruthless terrorists but also from foreign intimidations. We elected you as our next president because we thought you stood out of other candidates. You are more resourcefull serving the national interests. The most of the people endorsed you as the president because you eradicated terrorism in Sri Lanka. You have won the trust of the people. We admire you for restating democracy and reuniting our country.
It s also worth looking at past term (2005-2009) and reflect on shortcomings. Among other issues constant criticisms and allegations about media freedom, corruption, nepotism, political harassments, thuggery, murders, abductions and abuses of state media take significant impact on our people. People tolerated, sacrificed for the sake of war. We do not consider “war crimes” allegations of west during last stage of war since it was not intended but happened in a war situation. But we do aware that there is room for improvements in maintaining law and order in the country and democracy, tolerance for criticisms and opinions. The hard earned tax money of poor people needs to be utilized for the betterment of very same people and not for a group of people. We overlooked those allegations because you showed us how steady you are in decision making on national interests.
Today is the moment of glory, the moment of a birth of a national leader; one country, one law and one president. A leader, not for one group but to all the citizens despite to whom they have voted.
When it comes to “all”, it means different interests and needs, young and old, Tamil and Sinhalese, Christians and Muslims. A good leader would choose what is best for all.
The most important priority at the moment are the development in the North and East, national reconciliation and a political solution has to be taken within undivided Sri Lanka. There are people who have suffered three decades of war and their lives have to begin from scrap; from zero. Providing them basic needs, such as; food, clothes, shelter, medicine, health care, jobs and education will help them to understand us as a nation and seek their help to rebuild the nation.
There is increased violence, thuggery, intimidations, murders that need your immediate attention to bring perpetrators to justice and make Sri Lanka a better place to live. The bureaucracy of civil administration, murderers who walk-free because of corrupted system, decades dragging civil law cases sucking money out of poor people etc are burdens to poor people and are more important than banning adultery movies. We assume you are smarter than Taliban extremists, we do not wish to have extreme restrictions, we as Buddhists, respect freedom of speech and beliefs. In short we are thirst of democracy. So please educate every citizen about laws, rights and obligations, so you can reduce abuse of law and violence in the Country.
Mr. President, do not take extreme paths; neither extreme Buddhism nor extreme Islam. Stay in the middle path, the path where we all can walk freely! Then you will find hearts of all people, and we shall treat you as our king!!!
We sent you this message not to humiliate you but to congratulate you and to let you know that we love our president and our country. We hope you have an ear for us to listen what we got to say! We wish you all the best, the strength and the determination to deliver the promises you mentioned in your 2010 manifesto!
Subha Anagathayak!
NoEalamInSL
27.01.2010
Congratulations! You have won the Sri Lanka Presidential Election 2010. You have been rewarded by the people of Sri Lanka for the promises you delivered. You deserve that. You have been a great leader to the nation by delivering promises you made and defending us not only from the most ruthless terrorists but also from foreign intimidations. We elected you as our next president because we thought you stood out of other candidates. You are more resourcefull serving the national interests. The most of the people endorsed you as the president because you eradicated terrorism in Sri Lanka. You have won the trust of the people. We admire you for restating democracy and reuniting our country.
It s also worth looking at past term (2005-2009) and reflect on shortcomings. Among other issues constant criticisms and allegations about media freedom, corruption, nepotism, political harassments, thuggery, murders, abductions and abuses of state media take significant impact on our people. People tolerated, sacrificed for the sake of war. We do not consider “war crimes” allegations of west during last stage of war since it was not intended but happened in a war situation. But we do aware that there is room for improvements in maintaining law and order in the country and democracy, tolerance for criticisms and opinions. The hard earned tax money of poor people needs to be utilized for the betterment of very same people and not for a group of people. We overlooked those allegations because you showed us how steady you are in decision making on national interests.
Today is the moment of glory, the moment of a birth of a national leader; one country, one law and one president. A leader, not for one group but to all the citizens despite to whom they have voted.
When it comes to “all”, it means different interests and needs, young and old, Tamil and Sinhalese, Christians and Muslims. A good leader would choose what is best for all.
The most important priority at the moment are the development in the North and East, national reconciliation and a political solution has to be taken within undivided Sri Lanka. There are people who have suffered three decades of war and their lives have to begin from scrap; from zero. Providing them basic needs, such as; food, clothes, shelter, medicine, health care, jobs and education will help them to understand us as a nation and seek their help to rebuild the nation.
There is increased violence, thuggery, intimidations, murders that need your immediate attention to bring perpetrators to justice and make Sri Lanka a better place to live. The bureaucracy of civil administration, murderers who walk-free because of corrupted system, decades dragging civil law cases sucking money out of poor people etc are burdens to poor people and are more important than banning adultery movies. We assume you are smarter than Taliban extremists, we do not wish to have extreme restrictions, we as Buddhists, respect freedom of speech and beliefs. In short we are thirst of democracy. So please educate every citizen about laws, rights and obligations, so you can reduce abuse of law and violence in the Country.
Mr. President, do not take extreme paths; neither extreme Buddhism nor extreme Islam. Stay in the middle path, the path where we all can walk freely! Then you will find hearts of all people, and we shall treat you as our king!!!
We sent you this message not to humiliate you but to congratulate you and to let you know that we love our president and our country. We hope you have an ear for us to listen what we got to say! We wish you all the best, the strength and the determination to deliver the promises you mentioned in your 2010 manifesto!
Subha Anagathayak!
NoEalamInSL
27.01.2010
Wednesday, August 12, 2009
I have a dream in Sri Lanka!
I am not unmindful that some of you have come here out of great trials and tribulations. Some of you have come fresh from narrow jail cells. Some of you have come from areas where your quest for freedom left you battered by the storms of persecution and staggered by the winds of police brutality. You have been the veterans of creative suffering. Continue to work with the faith that unearned suffering is redemptive.
Go back to Killinochchi, go back to Mulutivu, go back to Trincomalee, go back to Batticaloa, go back to Jafna, go back to the slums and ghettos of our northern cities, knowing that somehow this situation can and will be changed. Let us not wallow in the valley of despair.
I say to you today, my friends, so even though we face the difficulties of today and tomorrow, I still have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the Sri Lankan dream.
I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal."
I have a dream that one day Tamils of North of Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese of South will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood.
I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.
I have a dream today.
I have a dream that one day, LTTE with its vicious racists, with its Tamil Diaspora having their lips dripping with the words of interposition and nullification; one day right there in Sri Lanka, little Tamil boys and Tamil girls will be able to join hands with little Sinhala/Muslim boys and Sinhala/Muslim girls as sisters and brothers.
I have a dream today.
I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, every hill and mountain shall be made low, the rough places will be made plain, and the crooked places will be made straight, and the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together.
This is our hope. This is the faith that I go back to the Sri Lanka with. With this faith we will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope. With this faith we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood. With this faith we will be able to work together, to pray together, to struggle together, to go to jail together, to stand up for freedom together, knowing that we will be free one day.
This will be the day when all of God's children will be able to sing with a new meaning, "My country, 'tis of thee, sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing. Land where my fathers died, land of the pilgrim's pride, from every mountainside, let freedom ring."
And if Sri Lanka is to be a great nation this must become true. So let freedom ring from the Central hilltops of Sri Lanka. Let freedom ring from the mighty mountains of Dumbara. Let freedom ring from the Jungles of Mulativu!
Let freedom ring from the North of Sri Lanka!
Let freedom ring from the South of Sri Lanka!
But not only that; let freedom ring from East of Sri Lanka!
Let freedom ring from West of Sri Lanka!
Let freedom ring from every hill and molehill of Nuwara-Eliya. From every mountainside of Badulla, let freedom ring.
And when this happens, when we allow freedom to ring, when we let it ring from every village and every hamlet, from every state and every city, we will be able to speed up that day when all of God's children, Tamil men and Sinhala men, Hindus and Buddhists, Muslims and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual, "Free at last! free at last! thank God Almighty, we are free at last!"
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Why could we not defeat LTTE for 25 years?
(By: A Retired Major General)
Last modified on: 6/29/2009 11:34:19 AM
All members of the security forces, past and present, and all citizens of this country no doubt are happy and celebrating the defeat of the LTTE, the most ruthless terrorist organization in the world, that had been a scourge not only to our country but the world for the past three decades.
Some Western nations must be unhappy that the lever they utilized to destabilize our nation is no more available for them. Locally, the stooges of those powers with vested interests too are unhappy since their peace wagon has got bogged down and off road for ever and they are unable to enjoy the free rides anymore. I have observed many of the past Commanders of all three forces who failed to achieve victory when they were at the helm of power also were among them to achieve their goals through peace means
Many a writer, including some armchair Generals has written to the press and come live on TV to tell us how the current Commanders have won the war, but none has explained why past Commanders could not or would not win the war when the LTTE was much weaker and was not well-established. If they won, perhaps, we would have saved the lives of thousands of youth of both sides and billions of rupees of our National wealth. That included the personal properties of our citizens of the North and South, and the valuable infrastructure facilities. When the North and East was burning, the retired Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals were discussing at various forums how to solve the National problem through peace negotiations, rather than advising the Commanders how to win the war in which they were inextricably engaged in. To me, it looked awkward, discouraging and meaningless in that needy hour.
Let us see why those Commanders failed to forge an end through military means when they were in power. First and foremost was the unnecessary political interference which came in many forms. Some politicians with connections with the security of the country had vested interests and were working towards achieving their aims of making money through purchase of arms and equipment for the Army, Navy and Air Force. Some Security Force Commanders who did not have the backbone either kept quiet and said yes to whatever the deals approved by the politicians, with the connivance and support of the bureaucrats in the Ministries. They too amassed wealth here and abroad. The troops in the front lines had to bear the brunt of it by getting killed using sub-standard arms and equipment and flying in obsolete aircraft bought through questionable shady deals.
Some top brass were hauled before the High Courts after their retirement and were even arrested and kept in remand. Others who still had the political backing either escaped through their cunning manoeuvring of technical points or using their ill-earned wealth by bribing politicians of the era. Thousands of troops sacrificed their lives in the arid battle fields like Pooneryn and Mullaitivu or plunged into the sea in aircraft that did not have even anti-missile protection.
Next, political interference was the denial of required manpower, arms and equipment to the Operation Commanders, quoting that the government did not have sufficient funds.
Whenever there was a respite in the war, the process of recruiting and continuous training of troops were abruptly stopped which is against all principles of maintaining combat readiness even during peace time. Once the war resumed, the field commanders were ordered to manage with what they had until the recruitment and training was complete to launch them to battle. This is what the President clearly understood through the wise counsel of Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the battle hardened brother of His Excellency. Gotabaya never subjected the Service Commanders or the front line Operational Commanders to such humiliating predicament and maintained the clear cut aim of defeating the LTTE and relentlessly worked towards achieving that aim despite opposition from many quarters as well as adverse international pressure. I am certain that the Service Commanders also insisted on their own requirements forcefully without wilting to the pressure of the financial constraints which the past Commanders did not do.
I have observed that when the senior service officers were getting professionally qualified and matured towards the end of the careers, their aim was to become the Head of the Service which is quite natural. The way they set about achieving it was not in keeping with the prime interests of the country. Invariably, many past Commanders of Services became "yes men" so that they approved anything the politicians wanted done irrespective of whether they were correct or not and injurious to the National interests.
Coming back to the political interference, at one stage, a politician planned the operations to win the elections. He insisted that an objective or an area be captured before the Provincial Council Elections. The Operational Commanders short of time, manpower and equipment either reluctantly agreed knowing that the operation would fail. The Service Commanders never intervened and advised the politicians not to pursue it, since they did not want to lose the command and the ambassadorial appointment they were dreaming of. Those Operation Commanders who did not want to sacrifice their principles as well as the troops who disagreed with the political big-wigs were sidelined and sent out of the service, sometimes ignominiously.
Old school, clanism and favouritism affected the operational efficiency of the Services. If a Service Commander's successor was from the same Regiment or same clan or the same school and of the same colour, well, he was the one to command the service and he was trained and groomed accordingly without taking into his consideration IQ or combat efficiency and professional competency. He was groomed in such a way that he naturally became an "yes man" as happened to our administrative bureaucracy, which is at the bottom of the administration mess today. This was what ailed the services which contributed to the failure of past Commanders, who almost ended up with Diplomatic appointments. Only a few obviously corrupted ones were denied this perk.
Commanders of this calibre never had the determination and the National aim of defeating the LTTE on top of their career agendas. Their aim was to command the Service and end up an Ambassador and to hell with the Nation.
The handing over of weapons and money to the LTTE by the highest political authority in the country was one of the biggest blunders that was unopposed and approved by the Army Commander and a Secretary of Defence who too were Three and Four Star Generals, both of whom knew that it was wrong and injurious and detrimental to the National security. The same duo approved even a worse blunder of handing over 600 policemen in the East to the LTTE, who drained them of their blood, butchered and buried them in mass graves. How could a Commander of this calibre and their front line Operational Commanders win the war when they supported the enemy which amounted to treason? Those top brass are basking in the glow of glory with medals and honours now. What a shame.
I believe the above facts would suffice to show readers why the war was not won for 25 years, under the corrupted. bias and inefficiency of politicians, and Service Commanders. I must congratulate and admire the present Service Commanders and the frontline Operation Commanders who were not malaised with the plagues enumerated above but received unstinted support and encouragement from the Commander-in-Chief of Services as well as his brother, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, that won the historic victory for Sri Lanka.
This account is incomplete without a word of praise to General Sarath Fonseka, who is not a favourite of a group or a clan but a valiant soldier who achieved his aim through determination and perseverance. He is rewarded for choosing front line Commanders who joined the Army in the infancy of the LTTE and grew up getting battered and hardened along with the growing LTTE which grew almost to a conventional Army with air and sea wings. Giving credit to international situation and their attitude towards Sri Lanka for annihilation and defeat of the LTTE to me is belittling of valiant achievement of Sons of Sri Lanka
Source: http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20090629_02
Last modified on: 6/29/2009 11:34:19 AM
All members of the security forces, past and present, and all citizens of this country no doubt are happy and celebrating the defeat of the LTTE, the most ruthless terrorist organization in the world, that had been a scourge not only to our country but the world for the past three decades.
Some Western nations must be unhappy that the lever they utilized to destabilize our nation is no more available for them. Locally, the stooges of those powers with vested interests too are unhappy since their peace wagon has got bogged down and off road for ever and they are unable to enjoy the free rides anymore. I have observed many of the past Commanders of all three forces who failed to achieve victory when they were at the helm of power also were among them to achieve their goals through peace means
Many a writer, including some armchair Generals has written to the press and come live on TV to tell us how the current Commanders have won the war, but none has explained why past Commanders could not or would not win the war when the LTTE was much weaker and was not well-established. If they won, perhaps, we would have saved the lives of thousands of youth of both sides and billions of rupees of our National wealth. That included the personal properties of our citizens of the North and South, and the valuable infrastructure facilities. When the North and East was burning, the retired Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals were discussing at various forums how to solve the National problem through peace negotiations, rather than advising the Commanders how to win the war in which they were inextricably engaged in. To me, it looked awkward, discouraging and meaningless in that needy hour.
Let us see why those Commanders failed to forge an end through military means when they were in power. First and foremost was the unnecessary political interference which came in many forms. Some politicians with connections with the security of the country had vested interests and were working towards achieving their aims of making money through purchase of arms and equipment for the Army, Navy and Air Force. Some Security Force Commanders who did not have the backbone either kept quiet and said yes to whatever the deals approved by the politicians, with the connivance and support of the bureaucrats in the Ministries. They too amassed wealth here and abroad. The troops in the front lines had to bear the brunt of it by getting killed using sub-standard arms and equipment and flying in obsolete aircraft bought through questionable shady deals.
Some top brass were hauled before the High Courts after their retirement and were even arrested and kept in remand. Others who still had the political backing either escaped through their cunning manoeuvring of technical points or using their ill-earned wealth by bribing politicians of the era. Thousands of troops sacrificed their lives in the arid battle fields like Pooneryn and Mullaitivu or plunged into the sea in aircraft that did not have even anti-missile protection.
Next, political interference was the denial of required manpower, arms and equipment to the Operation Commanders, quoting that the government did not have sufficient funds.
Whenever there was a respite in the war, the process of recruiting and continuous training of troops were abruptly stopped which is against all principles of maintaining combat readiness even during peace time. Once the war resumed, the field commanders were ordered to manage with what they had until the recruitment and training was complete to launch them to battle. This is what the President clearly understood through the wise counsel of Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the battle hardened brother of His Excellency. Gotabaya never subjected the Service Commanders or the front line Operational Commanders to such humiliating predicament and maintained the clear cut aim of defeating the LTTE and relentlessly worked towards achieving that aim despite opposition from many quarters as well as adverse international pressure. I am certain that the Service Commanders also insisted on their own requirements forcefully without wilting to the pressure of the financial constraints which the past Commanders did not do.
I have observed that when the senior service officers were getting professionally qualified and matured towards the end of the careers, their aim was to become the Head of the Service which is quite natural. The way they set about achieving it was not in keeping with the prime interests of the country. Invariably, many past Commanders of Services became "yes men" so that they approved anything the politicians wanted done irrespective of whether they were correct or not and injurious to the National interests.
Coming back to the political interference, at one stage, a politician planned the operations to win the elections. He insisted that an objective or an area be captured before the Provincial Council Elections. The Operational Commanders short of time, manpower and equipment either reluctantly agreed knowing that the operation would fail. The Service Commanders never intervened and advised the politicians not to pursue it, since they did not want to lose the command and the ambassadorial appointment they were dreaming of. Those Operation Commanders who did not want to sacrifice their principles as well as the troops who disagreed with the political big-wigs were sidelined and sent out of the service, sometimes ignominiously.
Old school, clanism and favouritism affected the operational efficiency of the Services. If a Service Commander's successor was from the same Regiment or same clan or the same school and of the same colour, well, he was the one to command the service and he was trained and groomed accordingly without taking into his consideration IQ or combat efficiency and professional competency. He was groomed in such a way that he naturally became an "yes man" as happened to our administrative bureaucracy, which is at the bottom of the administration mess today. This was what ailed the services which contributed to the failure of past Commanders, who almost ended up with Diplomatic appointments. Only a few obviously corrupted ones were denied this perk.
Commanders of this calibre never had the determination and the National aim of defeating the LTTE on top of their career agendas. Their aim was to command the Service and end up an Ambassador and to hell with the Nation.
The handing over of weapons and money to the LTTE by the highest political authority in the country was one of the biggest blunders that was unopposed and approved by the Army Commander and a Secretary of Defence who too were Three and Four Star Generals, both of whom knew that it was wrong and injurious and detrimental to the National security. The same duo approved even a worse blunder of handing over 600 policemen in the East to the LTTE, who drained them of their blood, butchered and buried them in mass graves. How could a Commander of this calibre and their front line Operational Commanders win the war when they supported the enemy which amounted to treason? Those top brass are basking in the glow of glory with medals and honours now. What a shame.
I believe the above facts would suffice to show readers why the war was not won for 25 years, under the corrupted. bias and inefficiency of politicians, and Service Commanders. I must congratulate and admire the present Service Commanders and the frontline Operation Commanders who were not malaised with the plagues enumerated above but received unstinted support and encouragement from the Commander-in-Chief of Services as well as his brother, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, that won the historic victory for Sri Lanka.
This account is incomplete without a word of praise to General Sarath Fonseka, who is not a favourite of a group or a clan but a valiant soldier who achieved his aim through determination and perseverance. He is rewarded for choosing front line Commanders who joined the Army in the infancy of the LTTE and grew up getting battered and hardened along with the growing LTTE which grew almost to a conventional Army with air and sea wings. Giving credit to international situation and their attitude towards Sri Lanka for annihilation and defeat of the LTTE to me is belittling of valiant achievement of Sons of Sri Lanka
Source: http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20090629_02
Monday, June 29, 2009
The politics of postwar Sri Lanka
Saturday, 27 June 2009
By Dayan Jayatilleka
As Paul Berman once wrote, "somewhere in the world it is always 1941". There comes a time in the life of every society when it is faced with an existential threat or challenge. It is the social forces or elements that rise up to this challenge and successfully overcome this threat that then have the power as well as the legitimacy to place their stamp on what comes after. Those who stood on the wrong side of history, or never rose to the occasion, or who abandoned the struggle partway, or simply failed; the defeated enemy, the collaborators, the appeasers and the fence-sitters — and these are not one and the same — all forfeit the chance to place their values, ideas and programs as the leading ones of the social order that follows the great test.
The truths are threefold. The truth is that the Tigers and the Tamil ultra-nationalists overestimated themselves and underestimated the Sinhalese, due to arrogance and racism. The last stage of the war saw a titanic clash of wills, between, on the one hand, the Tigers, the Tamil Diaspora and overseas Tamils from Canada to Chennai, their Western supporters and the Western media, and on the other, the Sinhala people, the armed forces, the Rajapakse leadership, a thin stratum of heroic Tamil rebels against Prabhakaran, and several friendly states. The Balasinghams wrote a book about the Tamil Eelam struggle with a neo-Nietzschean title, The Will to Freedom. The truth is that from a classically Nietzschean perspective, the Sinhalese Will to Power, i.e. to "prevail over" to "overcome" (which was Nietzsche’s meaning) on and over this small island, was and will in the final analysis always be, cannot but be, greater than that of the Tamils to secede. The truth is also that the Tigers, weakened by an Eastern Tamil rebellion, were defeated by a largely Sinhalese army, sustained by the Sinhala people whose collective will refused to break under decades of suicide bombings, body bags coming home to villages and assassinations of their leaders; the Sinhalese who, this time around, like the paradigmatic Silindu in Woolf’s Village in The Jungle, finally turned on their tormentors and blew them away.
If the social bloc that dominates the UNP wished a postwar Sri Lanka of their liking they should not have repeatedly blown the chances they had of defending the country’s territorial unity, integrity and sovereignty — but blow them it did.
JR Jayewardene did want to win the war, though Lalith Athulathmudali did say that operations were intended to prove to the Tigers that they had no military option. JRJ was perhaps the only UNP president that wanted to win the war and tried to, but he and his administration did not have the basic capacity or intelligence (a) to suppress Black July ’83 (b) not to tamper with the rules of the democratic game to such a degree that it split the Sinhalese and destabilized the domestic situation and (c) to maintain the kind of political relationship with India that would have permitted it to win the war and pre-empted Indian pre-emption, so to speak.
The Premadasa presidency had an admirable degree of multiethnic, multicultural pluralism in its make up and dominant ideology but it allowed the war effort to be paralyzed by infighting within the officer corps and under-funded by bureaucrats with a possible bias or lack of commitment. It made the right decision in putting Gen Denzil Kobbekaduwe in charge of the military effort but it did not consider a military victory possible or, on balance, desirable. (I was possibly the only one in the Premadasa camp whose policy memoranda to him pushed for a military victory. This heartbreaking effort is reflected in my book The Travails of a Democracy: Unfinished war, Protracted Crisis, Vikas, New Delhi 1995).
The UNP’s final chance came with the Prime Ministership of Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe who opted for a lopsided Ceasefire agreement at a time when the balance of forces had turned dramatically against the LTTE due to the successful operations of the Special Forces LRRP and the global anti-terrorist shift due to 9/11. The CFA permitted the buildup of the proto state structure of the Tigers and humiliated the Sri Lankan armed forces.
The moderate, Westernized wing of the SLFP had its chance to win the war and re-mould Sri Lanka in accordance with its more reformist pluralist ideology but it threw the chance away. The re-taking of Jaffna was vitiated by the failure to cut off the LTTE’s retreat thereby permitting the Tigers to escape together with large number of civilians, base themselves in Mullaitivu, regroup and make a dramatic comeback. The strategy was one of taking territory rather than annihilating the enemy; recruitment was negatively affected by campaigns such as Sudu Nelum, Thavalama and the efforts of NIPU etc; corruption was rampant in the sphere of procurement. Above all, there was no commitment to a strategic goal of destroying the enemy but rather to one of driving the Tigers to the negotiating table. Worst of all, Karuna’s rebellion was double-crossed and Prabhakaran’s Sea Tigers allowed to violate the CFA and land in his rear area; General Sarath Fonseka was transferred from Jaffna and placed on the shelf in charge of the Volunteers ( the Sunday Island carried many pieces by me around the time and after, vigorously criticizing the decision and arguing for his placement at the helm of our army); and the tsunami weakened Tigers were sought to be given an administrative–financial authority in the form of the PTOMS, probably as part of a deal with the TNA which would give a third term to the incumbent.
These are not the only critics of the Rajapakse administration and the postwar outcome. Others include the local and foreign NGOs comprising self–proclaimed civil society; the Churches; and the non-Tiger Tamil dissidents such the UTHR and SLDF. Had Colombo’s cosmopolitan civil society not been so totally pro-appeasement, had the churches been visibly and audibly critical of Tiger totalitarianism and exercised greater internal discipline (instead of allowing some of its clergymen to opt for Barabbas, as Fr Bernard continues to do from Mindanao), had the Tamil dissidents worked for a united front of anti-Tiger Tamils which could have launched a resistance struggle in the rear of the LTTE or backed Karuna and Douglas Devananda, who were the actually existing alternatives to the Tigers, their criticisms - pious, petulant or patronizing - of trends in postwar Sri Lanka would not have so little social legitimacy and traction. (I recall the response of an award winning Indian journalist of Tamil ethnicity who wrote a book on the war, when I praised the UTHR-J reports: "yeah, except for that Church of South India tone of preachy Protestant moralizing!")
None of this justifies any attempt by extremist lobbies to translate and degrade the victory of the Sri Lankan state, its armed forces and the people over the Tigers, a valiant victory which has the potential to be a liberation of all the peoples of the island from LTTE fascism, into an armed version, a militarized equivalent of 1956 or 1972 (the abolition of Section 29 and the formal enthronement of one language, religion and specific state form over others).Whatever their socially enabling and democratic aspects for the vast majority, both 1956 and 1972 contained for the minorities, a dimension of discrimination, domination and divisiveness.
No current critique, however trenchant, of postwar Sri Lankan trends approximates in its luminous perspicacity the following judgment:
"Separate identities have been sustained and fortified by deep antagonisms and wildly contested facts which extend over two millenia and more…Each fresh confrontation and every violent eruption becomes an instant invitation to an overpowering onrush of self-righteous recidivism, against which reason can only erect the feeblest defenses... Having co-opted the clergy, can militant Sinhalese-Buddhism rely on support from the armed services, too?... Now regional councils are coming up for air for the third (and last?) time. All the political parties are discussing the proposal, a shrewd… move to gain endorsement from a national consensus. But has political power already slipped out of the hands of politicians?"
Amazingly, these words appeared a shade over a quarter century ago in the pages of the Far Eastern Economic Review of January 26, 1984, pp22-23, and were written by Mervyn de Silva. Though a little late, I have wised-up sufficiently, not to doubt my father’s wisdom, but was this a description of some aspect of the reality at the time, or a latent tendency at any time given Sri Lankan society, history and mentality, or an early warning-cum-prediction? Only future history will tell.
Top of Form Bottom of Form
Does this mean that from a pluralist, reformist or modernist perspective all is lost either by cultural fore-ordination and teleology or by default and abdication? I would argue not necessarily, not inevitably, for three reasons, all discernible from a dialectical standpoint. These are the three potential sources of pluralist reform in postwar Sri Lanka. In ascending order of significance, the first is comprised of the Tamil allies and partners of the state and the governing party. Contrary to the crude, congruent distortions of Colombo’s liberals and their western patrons as well as the Sinhala hardliners, it is not the case that the anti-Tiger camp is monolithically and exclusively Sinhala hard-line while those who are for ethnic equality and autonomy belong to the "antiwar", "anti-state" and "antigovernment" camp. There is a strategically significant anti-Tiger, pro-state, pro-Govt Tamil stakeholder segment, which stands for equality and devolution.
The second driver of a more pluralist postwar outcome is the democratic system which includes the courts and above all, competitive elections. Municipal elections are imminent, Parliamentary elections are scheduled for the first half of next year and Northern provincial elections are unavoidably on the agenda. With proportional representation, the Tamil people will punch pretty much their demographic weight. Political space cannot but broaden, and the ensuing give-and-take is inevitable, eroding ideological blocs. Post-election, the postwar power bloc would be recomposed.
The third and final source is the external factor. Forget the unfair critics of Sri Lanka and those who tilt to the pro-Tiger Tamil Diaspora for one reason or the other. Those who stood by Sri Lanka during the war and its aftermath are crucially interested in political accommodation of the Tamil minority – with India being an obvious case in point, but by no means the only one holding this view. The statement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization led by China and Russia, which has admitted Sri Lanka as a "dialogue partner" (my regular readers, going back to the Weekend Express column may recognize that I canvassed for affiliation since its founding almost a decade ago), mentions not only "independence and sovereignty" but also "the rights of minorities".
It is the dynamic of interaction of these three factors within the anti-Tiger, "patriotic" universe, within the cosmos of the Sri Lankan state, within the power-bloc that won the war, which will make for pluralism, reform and possibly paradigm shift.
We shall need to pay heed to the views of our friends, local and foreign, as it becomes increasingly obvious that the Tiger army is destroyed but the Tiger movement or global network is still alive, a well-placed new generation of Tamil secessionists have been born overseas and have come of age, and though the war is decisively won, the protracted struggle with Tamil Tiger separatism on a world scale is hardly over. A long Cold War has just begun.
(These are the strictly personal views of the writer).
Courtesy: Island.lk
Last Updated ( Saturday, 27 June 2009 )
As Paul Berman once wrote, "somewhere in the world it is always 1941". There comes a time in the life of every society when it is faced with an existential threat or challenge. It is the social forces or elements that rise up to this challenge and successfully overcome this threat that then have the power as well as the legitimacy to place their stamp on what comes after. Those who stood on the wrong side of history, or never rose to the occasion, or who abandoned the struggle partway, or simply failed; the defeated enemy, the collaborators, the appeasers and the fence-sitters — and these are not one and the same — all forfeit the chance to place their values, ideas and programs as the leading ones of the social order that follows the great test.
The truths are threefold. The truth is that the Tigers and the Tamil ultra-nationalists overestimated themselves and underestimated the Sinhalese, due to arrogance and racism. The last stage of the war saw a titanic clash of wills, between, on the one hand, the Tigers, the Tamil Diaspora and overseas Tamils from Canada to Chennai, their Western supporters and the Western media, and on the other, the Sinhala people, the armed forces, the Rajapakse leadership, a thin stratum of heroic Tamil rebels against Prabhakaran, and several friendly states. The Balasinghams wrote a book about the Tamil Eelam struggle with a neo-Nietzschean title, The Will to Freedom. The truth is that from a classically Nietzschean perspective, the Sinhalese Will to Power, i.e. to "prevail over" to "overcome" (which was Nietzsche’s meaning) on and over this small island, was and will in the final analysis always be, cannot but be, greater than that of the Tamils to secede. The truth is also that the Tigers, weakened by an Eastern Tamil rebellion, were defeated by a largely Sinhalese army, sustained by the Sinhala people whose collective will refused to break under decades of suicide bombings, body bags coming home to villages and assassinations of their leaders; the Sinhalese who, this time around, like the paradigmatic Silindu in Woolf’s Village in The Jungle, finally turned on their tormentors and blew them away.
If the social bloc that dominates the UNP wished a postwar Sri Lanka of their liking they should not have repeatedly blown the chances they had of defending the country’s territorial unity, integrity and sovereignty — but blow them it did.
JR Jayewardene did want to win the war, though Lalith Athulathmudali did say that operations were intended to prove to the Tigers that they had no military option. JRJ was perhaps the only UNP president that wanted to win the war and tried to, but he and his administration did not have the basic capacity or intelligence (a) to suppress Black July ’83 (b) not to tamper with the rules of the democratic game to such a degree that it split the Sinhalese and destabilized the domestic situation and (c) to maintain the kind of political relationship with India that would have permitted it to win the war and pre-empted Indian pre-emption, so to speak.
The Premadasa presidency had an admirable degree of multiethnic, multicultural pluralism in its make up and dominant ideology but it allowed the war effort to be paralyzed by infighting within the officer corps and under-funded by bureaucrats with a possible bias or lack of commitment. It made the right decision in putting Gen Denzil Kobbekaduwe in charge of the military effort but it did not consider a military victory possible or, on balance, desirable. (I was possibly the only one in the Premadasa camp whose policy memoranda to him pushed for a military victory. This heartbreaking effort is reflected in my book The Travails of a Democracy: Unfinished war, Protracted Crisis, Vikas, New Delhi 1995).
The UNP’s final chance came with the Prime Ministership of Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe who opted for a lopsided Ceasefire agreement at a time when the balance of forces had turned dramatically against the LTTE due to the successful operations of the Special Forces LRRP and the global anti-terrorist shift due to 9/11. The CFA permitted the buildup of the proto state structure of the Tigers and humiliated the Sri Lankan armed forces.
The moderate, Westernized wing of the SLFP had its chance to win the war and re-mould Sri Lanka in accordance with its more reformist pluralist ideology but it threw the chance away. The re-taking of Jaffna was vitiated by the failure to cut off the LTTE’s retreat thereby permitting the Tigers to escape together with large number of civilians, base themselves in Mullaitivu, regroup and make a dramatic comeback. The strategy was one of taking territory rather than annihilating the enemy; recruitment was negatively affected by campaigns such as Sudu Nelum, Thavalama and the efforts of NIPU etc; corruption was rampant in the sphere of procurement. Above all, there was no commitment to a strategic goal of destroying the enemy but rather to one of driving the Tigers to the negotiating table. Worst of all, Karuna’s rebellion was double-crossed and Prabhakaran’s Sea Tigers allowed to violate the CFA and land in his rear area; General Sarath Fonseka was transferred from Jaffna and placed on the shelf in charge of the Volunteers ( the Sunday Island carried many pieces by me around the time and after, vigorously criticizing the decision and arguing for his placement at the helm of our army); and the tsunami weakened Tigers were sought to be given an administrative–financial authority in the form of the PTOMS, probably as part of a deal with the TNA which would give a third term to the incumbent.
These are not the only critics of the Rajapakse administration and the postwar outcome. Others include the local and foreign NGOs comprising self–proclaimed civil society; the Churches; and the non-Tiger Tamil dissidents such the UTHR and SLDF. Had Colombo’s cosmopolitan civil society not been so totally pro-appeasement, had the churches been visibly and audibly critical of Tiger totalitarianism and exercised greater internal discipline (instead of allowing some of its clergymen to opt for Barabbas, as Fr Bernard continues to do from Mindanao), had the Tamil dissidents worked for a united front of anti-Tiger Tamils which could have launched a resistance struggle in the rear of the LTTE or backed Karuna and Douglas Devananda, who were the actually existing alternatives to the Tigers, their criticisms - pious, petulant or patronizing - of trends in postwar Sri Lanka would not have so little social legitimacy and traction. (I recall the response of an award winning Indian journalist of Tamil ethnicity who wrote a book on the war, when I praised the UTHR-J reports: "yeah, except for that Church of South India tone of preachy Protestant moralizing!")
None of this justifies any attempt by extremist lobbies to translate and degrade the victory of the Sri Lankan state, its armed forces and the people over the Tigers, a valiant victory which has the potential to be a liberation of all the peoples of the island from LTTE fascism, into an armed version, a militarized equivalent of 1956 or 1972 (the abolition of Section 29 and the formal enthronement of one language, religion and specific state form over others).Whatever their socially enabling and democratic aspects for the vast majority, both 1956 and 1972 contained for the minorities, a dimension of discrimination, domination and divisiveness.
No current critique, however trenchant, of postwar Sri Lankan trends approximates in its luminous perspicacity the following judgment:
"Separate identities have been sustained and fortified by deep antagonisms and wildly contested facts which extend over two millenia and more…Each fresh confrontation and every violent eruption becomes an instant invitation to an overpowering onrush of self-righteous recidivism, against which reason can only erect the feeblest defenses... Having co-opted the clergy, can militant Sinhalese-Buddhism rely on support from the armed services, too?... Now regional councils are coming up for air for the third (and last?) time. All the political parties are discussing the proposal, a shrewd… move to gain endorsement from a national consensus. But has political power already slipped out of the hands of politicians?"
Amazingly, these words appeared a shade over a quarter century ago in the pages of the Far Eastern Economic Review of January 26, 1984, pp22-23, and were written by Mervyn de Silva. Though a little late, I have wised-up sufficiently, not to doubt my father’s wisdom, but was this a description of some aspect of the reality at the time, or a latent tendency at any time given Sri Lankan society, history and mentality, or an early warning-cum-prediction? Only future history will tell.
Top of Form Bottom of Form
Does this mean that from a pluralist, reformist or modernist perspective all is lost either by cultural fore-ordination and teleology or by default and abdication? I would argue not necessarily, not inevitably, for three reasons, all discernible from a dialectical standpoint. These are the three potential sources of pluralist reform in postwar Sri Lanka. In ascending order of significance, the first is comprised of the Tamil allies and partners of the state and the governing party. Contrary to the crude, congruent distortions of Colombo’s liberals and their western patrons as well as the Sinhala hardliners, it is not the case that the anti-Tiger camp is monolithically and exclusively Sinhala hard-line while those who are for ethnic equality and autonomy belong to the "antiwar", "anti-state" and "antigovernment" camp. There is a strategically significant anti-Tiger, pro-state, pro-Govt Tamil stakeholder segment, which stands for equality and devolution.
The second driver of a more pluralist postwar outcome is the democratic system which includes the courts and above all, competitive elections. Municipal elections are imminent, Parliamentary elections are scheduled for the first half of next year and Northern provincial elections are unavoidably on the agenda. With proportional representation, the Tamil people will punch pretty much their demographic weight. Political space cannot but broaden, and the ensuing give-and-take is inevitable, eroding ideological blocs. Post-election, the postwar power bloc would be recomposed.
The third and final source is the external factor. Forget the unfair critics of Sri Lanka and those who tilt to the pro-Tiger Tamil Diaspora for one reason or the other. Those who stood by Sri Lanka during the war and its aftermath are crucially interested in political accommodation of the Tamil minority – with India being an obvious case in point, but by no means the only one holding this view. The statement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization led by China and Russia, which has admitted Sri Lanka as a "dialogue partner" (my regular readers, going back to the Weekend Express column may recognize that I canvassed for affiliation since its founding almost a decade ago), mentions not only "independence and sovereignty" but also "the rights of minorities".
It is the dynamic of interaction of these three factors within the anti-Tiger, "patriotic" universe, within the cosmos of the Sri Lankan state, within the power-bloc that won the war, which will make for pluralism, reform and possibly paradigm shift.
We shall need to pay heed to the views of our friends, local and foreign, as it becomes increasingly obvious that the Tiger army is destroyed but the Tiger movement or global network is still alive, a well-placed new generation of Tamil secessionists have been born overseas and have come of age, and though the war is decisively won, the protracted struggle with Tamil Tiger separatism on a world scale is hardly over. A long Cold War has just begun.
(These are the strictly personal views of the writer).
Courtesy: Island.lk
Last Updated ( Saturday, 27 June 2009 )
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